Georgia treats informed consent as a statutory obligation, not a standalone common law doctrine. The governing statute, O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1, establishes when the disclosure requirement applies, what information must be communicated, how that communication may occur, and what legal consequences follow from a failure to disclose. Understanding informed consent in Georgia requires careful attention to this statutory framework, because the state’s approach differs from jurisdictions that ground informed consent in judge-made common law principles. Treatment execution errors, surgical technique, and clinical decision-making during a procedure are distinct subjects addressed elsewhere.
Which Procedures Trigger the Requirement
The informed consent obligation under O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1 does not apply to all medical care. The statute applies specifically to two categories of procedures: any surgical procedure performed under general anesthesia, spinal anesthesia, or major regional anesthesia, and certain diagnostic procedures, namely amniocentesis and diagnostic procedures involving the intravenous or intraductal injection of a contrast material. Outside these categories, the statute does not mandate the formal disclosure process it prescribes.
This limited scope means that many routine medical interventions, including office-based procedures performed under local anesthesia, diagnostic imaging without contrast injection, and nonsurgical treatments, fall outside the statute’s disclosure mandate. The statutory boundary is significant because it defines which claims can invoke the informed consent framework and which cannot.
Material Risk Disclosure Requirements
When the statute applies, the responsible physician must ensure that the patient is informed, in general terms, of specific categories of information before the procedure. These categories include: a diagnosis of the patient’s condition requiring the procedure, the nature and purpose of the proposed procedure, the material risks of the procedure, alternative treatment options, and the prognosis if the proposed procedure is rejected.
The statute identifies specific material risks that must be disclosed. These include infection, allergic reaction, severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or organ, paralysis or partial paralysis, paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage, cardiac arrest, and death. The operative qualifier is that these risks must be “generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians” and must be of a nature that, if disclosed to a “reasonably prudent person” in the patient’s position, would cause the person to decline the procedure.
This statutory language raises a nuanced question about Georgia’s disclosure standard. The reference to risks “generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians” suggests a physician-oriented standard, meaning the disclosure obligation is measured by what the medical profession considers appropriate to disclose. However, the simultaneous reference to what would cause a “reasonably prudent person” to decline the procedure introduces a patient-oriented element into the analysis. At least one secondary legal source has categorized Georgia under a “reasonable patient” standard based on this language. The precise doctrinal alignment between these two reference points should be verified at time of publication, as the interplay between the physician-side and patient-side formulations has not been definitively resolved in a manner that permits confident labeling in either direction.
A Signed Consent Form Does Not Equal Informed Consent
The statute creates a rebuttable presumption of valid consent when a written consent form discloses the required information in general terms and is signed by the patient or authorized person. This presumption is significant, but it is not conclusive. A signed form shifts the burden to the patient to demonstrate that consent was not, in fact, informed, but it does not foreclose the inquiry.
Conversely, when the required consent is not obtained in writing, no presumption of validity arises. The absence of a signed form does not automatically invalidate the consent, but it removes the evidentiary advantage the form would otherwise provide.
The distinction between a signed form and actual informed consent is critical. A patient may sign a form without having meaningfully understood the information it contains. A form may be presented in a manner that does not afford the patient a genuine opportunity to ask questions or consider alternatives. The statute permits the required information to be communicated through multiple channels, including conversations with nurses, physician assistants, trained counselors, patient educators, video materials, pamphlets, and booklets, so long as the responsible physician ensures that the disclosure obligation is met. However, when hospital employees participate in these conversations at the physician’s request, the statute specifies that such employees are considered solely the agent of the responsible physician for informed consent purposes.
The legal consequence of a failure to comply with the statute’s disclosure requirements is also defined by the statute itself. A violation does not create a separate cause of action. Instead, it may give rise to a claim for medical malpractice as defined in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-70 and governed by the state’s existing malpractice framework. This means that an informed consent claim must satisfy the same elements as any other malpractice claim, including the requirement that the disclosure failure was a proximate cause of the patient’s injury.
Consider a scenario where a patient undergoes a qualifying surgical procedure under general anesthesia. Before the procedure, the patient signs a consent form. However, the form does not reference a specific material risk that is generally recognized by reasonably prudent physicians for this type of procedure. The risk materializes, and the patient suffers the corresponding injury. The claim would allege that the failure to disclose that specific material risk deprived the patient of the information needed to make an informed decision about whether to proceed, and that a reasonably prudent person, had the risk been disclosed, would have declined the procedure.
Verify current status of all statutes, rules, and judicial holdings at time of publication; legislative or judicial changes may have occurred.
Disclaimer
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The statutes, rules, judicial holdings, and legal principles referenced in this content reflect the law as understood at the time of writing. Georgia law is subject to legislative amendment, judicial reinterpretation, and regulatory change at any time. Specific provisions discussed herein, including but not limited to damage cap rulings, tort reform legislation, statutes of limitation and repose, expert qualification standards, and procedural filing requirements, may have been modified, superseded, or reinterpreted after the date of publication. Readers must independently verify the current status of all legal authorities cited before relying on any information contained in this content.
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